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WRAP CONTRACTS: HOW THEY CAN WORK BETTER FOR 
BUSINESSES AND CONSUMERS 
ABSTRACT 
 
In most online transactions, consumers enter into contracts without 
understanding or knowing the terms of the contract. Although 
technology has improved economic efficiency, and convenient access to 
low-cost or free products and services is now expected by consumers, 
the cost of conducting business is still high. The tradeoff for such 
convenience is forfeiting important rights and exchanging valuable 
consideration such as proprietary data. Consumers have a duty to read 
contracts, but studies overwhelmingly demonstrate that consumers are 
not reading; and, if they are reading these contracts, they do not 
understand them. Traditional elements of contract formation have 
essentially morphed into one general issue: whether there was 
sufficient notice that a contract exists. As a result of the gap between 
consumer contracts (or “wrap contracts”) and contract law, consumer 
contracts are predominantly one-sided and esoterically unreadable, 
unnoticeable, and more favorable to the businesses. When consumers 
wish to challenge the transaction and contract terms after being 
dissatisfied with the product or service, consumers learn that in most 
circumstances, there are limited remedies available. The result is the 
courts’ engagement in reactive legal analysis that varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction—and this negatively impacts both 
consumers and businesses. Despite the advantage businesses have over 
consumers, some businesses have attempted to impose terms that later 
turn out to be unenforceable, which is not favorable to the business 
either. So, businesses would also benefit from clear standards 
regarding contract presentation and what is considered 
unconscionable. The least that should be required to establish fairness 
and transparency is to legally specify the manner in which consumer 
contracts are being presented to consumers. In addition to modifying 
the presentation of these consumer contracts, there should be graylisted 
terms in non-negotiated contracts so that there is less confusion as to 
what type of terms are enforceable. California, being on the forefront 
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of much of the contract law reform, can set an example for other 
jurisdictions to further protect consumers and businesses and provide 
fair, simple, and clear standards. The end goal would be for federal law 
to enact a similar statute that would apply to all states. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to Internet World Stats, in 2017, there were 
approximately 287 million Internet users in the United States.1 Most 
websites, particularly those that feature application (“App”) platforms 
and other related software programs, contain online contracts that bind 
users to certain contractual terms and conditions. In many cases, users 
(1) are unaware of these contracts, which are non-negotiable (meaning 
that the business drafts the contract and the consumer must either agree 
to the terms or not use the product/service), and (2) lack the 
fundamental understanding and comprehension of what they are 
authorizing when using the product or service.2  
The tradeoff for increased efficiency in these contracts is forfeiting 
valuable rights and potentially increasing the user’s vulnerability to 
cybercrime or fraud.3 Online transactions are highly efficient and 
necessary; however, businesses have indulged in online technology 
practices where they craft and mandate rules that protect their business 
models and usurp users’ rights, including privacy rights.4 While 
technological advancements have resulted in contract laws being 
generally favorable to the businesses, they are not at any fault for 
utilizing such favorable bargaining power to their advantage, especially 
because many products and services are free or low-cost. Courts and 
_____________________________ 
1. Internet Usage and 2017 Population Statistics for North America, INTERNET 
WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm#north (last updated 
June 30, 2017) (providing documented analytical information regarding worldwide 
Internet usage, among other statistical analysis). 
2. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in 
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 456 (2002); Andrew A. Schwartz, 
Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 
313, 316 (2011) (“As a matter of contract doctrine, a nonnegotiable standard form 
consumer contract is viewed as a ‘contract of adhesion,’ and its terms are subject to a 
substantive judicial review for fairness.”). 
3. Mark Sullivan, Data Snatchers! The Booming Market for Your Online 
Identity, PCWORLD (June 26, 2012, 8:01 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/ 
article/258034/data_snatchers_the_booming_market_for_your_online_identity.html 
(explaining that, to make money, Facebook collects personal data from its users that 
is valuable to marketers and advertisers). 
4. NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 112 
(2013) [hereinafter WRAP CONTRACTS] (analyzing the emergence of wrap contracts 
and how technology has advanced ahead of legislation that would regulate oppressive 
contracting). 
3
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Congress are generally reactive rather than proactive, leaving 
businesses to operate in a vacuum, generating uncertainty, confusion, 
and increased risk exposure that is inherently detrimental to consumers 
and to businesses themselves.5 United States consumer law has not kept 
up with the high-velocity technology platforms that businesses are 
inventing and rolling out to the market. 
In response to this market imbalance and lack of clarity in consumer 
contracts (especially online contracts), this comment proposes that 
California enact legislation to address these deficiencies in consumer 
contracts. A task force of concerned citizens, government officials, 
attorneys, economic experts, business professionals from different 
industries, and members of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and 
California Department of Consumer Affairs (“CCA”) should be 
formed. The task force would assist the legislature in the process of 
adopting legislation to resolve issues of notice, readability, consent, and 
unconscionability in non-negotiated consumer contracts. Enacting such 
legislation requires a concerted effort of enforcement by the courts and 
regulatory agencies, such as the FTC and CCA. Non-negotiated 
consumer contracts should be: in plain English; unambiguous; easy to 
skim; contain clear headings that describe each term; and (for online 
contracts) require clickwrap for consent purposes. To address the issue 
of bargaining imbalances, this legislation should also graylist 
substantively unconscionable terms that foreclose various substantive 
rights (for example, choice of law) to a more heightened level of judicial 
scrutiny that is clearly delineated. 
To demonstrate the need for these procedural and substantive 
reforms, Part II of this comment provides statistical analysis 
demonstrating that consumers do not read the contracts they enter into, 
despite their corresponding duty to read. Part III provides background 
information contrasting traditional contract doctrine with the evolving 
law surrounding wrap contracts (modern consumer contracts). Part IV 
discusses laws implemented in other countries and proposals made by 
scholars to reform United States contract law addressing underlying 
consumer contractual deficiencies, while also explaining 
unconscionability in practice and how it should play a stronger role in 
_____________________________ 
5. Nancy S. Kim & D.A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-
Governmental Actors and the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 
745, 748 (2015) (discussing government datamining in private companies and the 
myth of contractual consent). 
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consumer contracts. Finally, Part V outlines and describes the 
legislation this comment proposes as a means to assist consumers and 
create a contracting environment that is fair for all parties. The proposed 
legislation is entitled, The Simplified Consumer Contracts Act 
(“SCCA”). 
II.  LACK OF READABILITY AND ITS COERCIVE POWER 
Studies reveal consumers fail to read online contracts, which leads 
to the conclusion that most consumers are uninformed about the 
transactions they agree to. However, failing to read an online contract 
is somewhat understandable, especially considering the number of 
contracts consumers enter into and the time it would take to read all the 
terms included. This leads to troubling results, given that consumers 
have a legal “duty to read” contracts they enter into, whether online or 
not. 
A.  Studies on Consent and Readability of Contracts 
According to a New York University Law School study, only 1 or 
2 consumers out of 1000 read an online consumer license agreement; 
of that, the average reader spent only twenty-nine seconds reading.6 The 
study compared social media terms of use (“TOU”) with consumer 
license agreements (“CLA”)—which are licenses that grant users 
permission to use the software—and found that the average social 
media TOU was more than twice the length of the CLA.7 The study’s 
data was obtained from monitoring one month of Internet use from 
48,154 website users.8 In tracking all Internet usage from these 48,154 
_____________________________ 
6. Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Wolves of the World Wide Web: 
Reforming Social Networks’ Contracting Practices, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1431, 
1432–34 (2014) [hereinafter Contracting Practices] (citing Aggressive Sales Tactics 
on the Internet and Their Impact on American Consumers: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. 27 (2009) (statement of Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler, Professor of Law, N.Y.U.)). 
7. Id. 
8. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone 
Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 19 (2014) (addressing concerns of the uninformed consumers and the 
statistics that demonstrate the businesses’ advantage). 
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users, only 1 in 200 even clicked on the page that contained the TOU.9 
Of about 29,000 visits to websites that contained free software, only 43 
users even visited the page that contained the CLA.10 
In a recent University of Connecticut and York University 
integrated study, researchers created a fake social networking site called 
“Name Drop.”11 The survey selected 543 students, and Name Drop’s 
two agreements for use of service were the privacy policy and TOU, 
containing 7977 and 4316 words, respectively.12 On average, the 
privacy policy would have taken thirty minutes to read, and the TOU 
would have taken sixteen minutes.13 The TOU granted Name Drop the 
right to pass along anything users shared on Name Drop to the United 
States National Security Agency (“NSA”).14 Only 1 of 500 users voiced 
a concern about this term to Name Drop.15 The right to privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment is sacrosanct, as it protects people from 
unreasonable government intrusion of their person and property.16 Yet, 
all but one user noticed the term and understood its repercussions in a 
way that caused him or her to express concern.17 
_____________________________ 
9. Id. at 24.  
10. Id. 
11. Shankar Vedantam, Do You Read Terms of Service Contracts? Not Many 
Do, Research Shows, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 23, 2016, 5:06 AM ET) [hereinafter 
NPR], http://www.npr.org/2016/08/23/491024846/do-you-read-terms-of-service-
contracts-not-many-do-research-shows.  
12. David Kravets, TOS Agreements Require Giving Up First Born–And Users 
Gladly Consent, ARS TECHNICA (July 12, 2016, 3:20 PM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/07/nobody-reads-tos-agreements-even-
ones-that-demand-first-born-as-payment/. 
13. Id. 
14. NPR, supra note 11. 
15. Id. 
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“[The Fourth] Amendment 
protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its 
protections go further . . . .”). 
17. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 405 (2012).  
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A more outrageous term was that as a form of payment, users would 
forfeit their first-born child.18 Only 2 of 500 users noticed this term.19 
Although forfeiting your first-born child as compensation is 
frightening, the NSA term is still unsettling, and is a slightly more 
extreme version of Twitter’s privacy policy (and the policies of other 
social media services). The Twitter privacy policy in part states, “we 
may preserve or disclose your information if we believe that it is 
reasonably necessary to comply with a law, regulation, legal process, 
or governmental request . . . .”20 Name Drop’s NSA provision expands 
Twitter’s narrower “we believe [] is reasonably necessary” disclosure 
criterion to “anything.” However, reasonably necessary is not clearly 
delineated. Still, Twitter is a widely used platform (for example, by 
United States President Donald Trump) that has relatively broad 
discretionary authority to disclose private data to the government. Amid 
the current Facebook controversy regarding collection of data from its 
web site and from its mobile device App, Facebook allegedly had to 
scramble to rewrite its data policy, even though Facebook’s 
presentation and content of its terms appear more consumer friendly 
than Twitter’s.21 
The next study examined whether consumers understand the terms 
of these contracts and specifically, privacy policies. According to a 
University of Pennsylvania study on consumer advertising, 62 percent 
of consumers believed privacy policies protected their privacy, 
meaning that they were unaware privacy policies more so limit 
_____________________________ 
18. Ian Paul, Goodbye, First Born Children: This Study Shows How Wordy 
Terms of Service Hurts Users, PCWORLD (July 13, 2016, 7:44 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/3094855/internet/goodbye-firstborn-children-this-
study-shows-how-wordy-terms-of-service-hurt-users.html. 
19. NPR, supra note 11.  
20. Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/privacy?lang=en (last updated 
June 18, 2017); But cf. Data Policy, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ (last updated Sept. 29, 2016) 
(“Information we receive about you, including financial transaction data related to 
purchases made with Facebook, may be accessed, processed and retained for an 
extended period of time when it is the subject of a legal request or obligation, 
governmental investigation, or investigations concerning possible violations of our 
terms or policies, or otherwise to prevent harm.”). 
21. Josh Constine, Facebook Rewrites Terms of Service, Clarifying Device Data 
Collection, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 4, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/04/ 
acebook-terms-of-service/. 
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privacy.22 In fact, 50 percent of consumers in the study agreed with the 
statement that “[e]xisting laws and organizational practices provide a 
reasonable level of protection for consumer privacy today.”23 If most 
consumers are not even aware of what privacy policies entail, it is 
questionable that half of consumers are comfortable with how their 
privacy rights are curtailed. The results of this study are not surprising 
considering that online contracts surpass the ability of average adults to 
understand them, corroborating the notion that consent is conceptually 
flawed.24 According to the same study, 97 percent of consumers do not 
know what they are reading.25 For these reasons, the laws should 
change to at least provide consumers the opportunity to be informed by 
requiring such contracts be noticeable and understandable because then 
there would be no excuse for consumers not to read them.26 
Even when businesses provide sufficient notice of contracts and the 
consumer reads them, consumers frequently lack the capacity to read 
because of the theory of information overload.27 In one study conducted 
by Michael Masson and Mary Anne Waldron, participants were 
presented with excerpts of four contracts: a mortgage, a property sale, 
a bank loan, and a lease renewal.28 Then, each participant was measured 
on how long they took to read the four contracts.29 The study explored 
_____________________________ 
22. See JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., CONTRARY TO WHAT MARKETERS SAY, 
AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE 
IT 1, 21 (2009) [hereinafter TAILORED ADVERTISING SURVEY], 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/20090929-Tailored_ 
Advertising.pdf; Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1360 (2011) [hereinafter Contract’s Adaptation] (explaining the 
contract practices of software companies). 
23. TAILORED ADVERTISING SURVEY, supra note 22, at 21. 
24. See generally Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and 
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 233–39 (2002) (explaining that consumer 
contracts must comport with the reading competence of the general population).   
25. Id. at 237. 
26. Id. at 235.  
27. James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 197 
(2013) (advocating for the reform of the unconscionability analysis by allowing sellers 
and buyers to work together to minimize boilerplate provisions if both parties can 
agree to adjust the cost). 
28. Id. at 196.  
29. See generally Michael E.J. Masson & Mary Anne Waldron, Comprehension 
of Legal Contracts by Non-Experts: Effectiveness of Plain Language Redrafting, 8 
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], No. 1, Art. 14
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol54/iss1/14
Daiza camera ready (Do Not Delete) 7/10/2018  11:12 AM 
2017] WRAP CONTRACTS 209 
the use of plain English in contracts, testing four different versions of 
each contract with varying degrees of complexity in its wording.30 The 
average contract contained 3016 words.31 The average consumer read 
contractual language at a rate of 177.5 words per minute.32 The total 
words each subject read was 74,897, which would take over seven hours 
to read without a moment’s rest.33 The information processing costs are 
so significant that an economically-rational consumer might focus that 
valuable time instead on understanding the features of the product or 
service, and focusing on material terms they can understand.34 To 
translate the time spent reading these contracts into economic terms, the 
value of reading consumer contracts is converted to an average of 
ninety-three words to the dollar, which is not economically efficient 
compared to the number of contracts consumers enter into.35 
Schwartz and Wilde’s informed minority theory counters the theory 
of information overload by explaining that the market adequately 
responds to consumer preferences, because the informed minority who 
takes the time to read and learn about the transaction will adequately 
advocate for consumer preferences.36 While this argument sounds 
promising, it assumes that the informed minority have preferences 
similar to the majority, and that there is homogeneity.37 In consumer 
law, homogeneity is questionable because the majority of consumers 
fail to read contractual terms, demonstrating the value they place on the 
time spent attempting to understand the terms.38 Additionally, the 
informed minority is such so small that they do not have the numbers 
to adequately shape the market, nor can they vindicate the rights for 
_____________________________ 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 67, 67–85 (1994) (measuring and comparing 
comprehension levels between plain English and legalese). 
30. Gibson, supra note 27, at 198. 
31. Id. at 195. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 196. 
34. Id.  
35. Id. at 197. 
36. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis 
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 
671 (1979) (describing how imperfect information to consumers prevents utility 
maximizing contract choice). 
37. Gibson, supra note 27, at 201. 
38. Id. at 202. 
9
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others without significant support. To put this theory into perspective, 
if the informed minority attempted to read on average all the privacy 
disclosures they received in 2008, it would have taken that person 
seventy-six work days to complete the task during that year.39 The 
informed minority in Name Drop consisted of just one or two people 
who voiced a concern regarding the terms relating to the NSA and 
forfeiting an unborn child. To protect themselves, other users would 
have to use unconscionability as a shield to invalidate the terms. 
B.  The Flesch Readability Ease Scale 
Many statistical formulas have been created to compute whether a 
writing is understandable to the average reader. The most commonly 
used readability formula in the United States is the Flesch Readability 
Ease Scale.40 This formula analyzes total word length and total syllables 
per word.41 The scale ranges from zero (practically impossible to read) 
to one hundred (easy for any literate person).42 The standard of 
readability is a score of at least sixty, which is classified as high school 
level readable.43 Using the Flesch Readability Ease Scale, a study 
conducted by University of Wake Forest revealed that of the 329 most 
common social media services in the market, the mean score of their 
TOU readability was 47.8, and 39 percent of the TOU were classified 
as fairly difficult to read.44 The average rights-foreclosure term was 
scored 7.2 grade levels above the average reading grade level of the 
overall contract (i.e. graduate school level and above).45 Rights-
foreclosure terms essentially usurp important contractual and 
constitutional rights, and instead create benefits to the provider through 
“warranty disclaimers, limitation[s] of liability, and mandatory 
arbitration clauses.”46 In addition, only 43 percent of rights-foreclosure 
_____________________________ 
39. Kim & Telman, supra note 5, at 733. 
40. Contracting Practices, supra note 6, at 1459.  
41. Id. at 1458. 
42. Id. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 1466. 
46. Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet Letters: Social 
Media Stigmatization of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L. REV. 592, 628 
(2015). 
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], No. 1, Art. 14
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol54/iss1/14
Daiza camera ready (Do Not Delete) 7/10/2018  11:12 AM 
2017] WRAP CONTRACTS 211 
terms within these contracts were conspicuous (noticeable enough to 
catch the attention of readers as they went through the contract).47 This 
means that even if the consumer attempts to read the contract, they will 
have difficulty understanding its terms or identifying rights-foreclosure 
terms. 
C.  The Duty to Read 
Consumers generally have a duty to read contracts they enter into, 
regardless of whether they actually read it, or whether the contract is 
understandable to the average consumer.48 The duty to read attaches 
when there is sufficient notice of the contract, which means the drafter 
directs the attention of the non-drafting party to the existence of a 
binding agreement.49 Sufficient notice can be actual or constructive.50  
Constructive notice occurs when circumstances are sufficient to put a 
reasonably prudent person on inquiry notice of the terms.51 In practice, 
constructive notice of online contracts is based on the visibility and 
wording of the notice—whether it says “Click here for the Terms of 
Service,” or “You must Agree to our Terms of Use,” with a link 
provided in that same location.52 The Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) requires conspicuous writing for specific terms excluding or 
modifying warranties on products, but not on all rights-foreclosure 
terms, such as limitations on remedies, liabilities, jury trials, etc.53 
The duty to read can lead to “drafters [having] a free pass to sneak 
in one-sided terms . . . .”54 When consumer contracts are functionally 
unreadable or terms are hidden, the duty to read becomes conceptually 
_____________________________ 
47. Contracting Practices, supra note 6, at 1485. 
48. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1577 (rev. 
ed. 1937).  
49. Specht v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 31 (2d Cir. 2002). 
50. CAL. CIV. CODE § 18 (West 2007).  
51. Specht, 306 F.3d at 31. 
52. WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at 127. 
53. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); 
Contract’s Adaptation, supra note 22, at 1338. 
54. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law, 
5 EUR. REV. OF CONT. L. 1, 8 (2009) (proposing non-legal approaches to make 
contracts more transparent). 
11
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unfair.55 Consumers generally do not read contracts because it is time-
consuming, the terms are difficult to read, and the terms are often non-
negotiable.56 Their decision to read a contract is also affected by 
whether the terms are available before or after the transaction is 
complete, in small or large print, at the top of the page, in a unified 
agreement, in plain English, long or short in length, or whether they are 
paying for the service.57 In effect, consumers invoke a cost-benefit 
analysis when deciding whether to read online contracts. The cost-
benefit analysis shifts dramatically when the consumer has invested 
significant resources—for example, if the consumer obtains a license 
for an expensive software program and wants to understand what he or 
she can do with the license.58 One aspect of this type of cost-benefit 
analysis that is sometimes overlooked is that consumers essentially 
purchase services by giving up private data, which has a marketable 
value.59 Consumers’ confidential information is a proprietary interest 
that they usually and unknowingly forfeit when using a product or 
service.60 Considering contracts between businesses and consumers are 
symbiotic relationships, it would further both sides if the terms were 
clear and reasonable to both parties. Businesses can reinforce their style 
and brand by drafting a contract that is enforceable while 
simultaneously addressing consumers’ interests in fairness and privacy 
concerns; so, if the consumer is not reading the contract, the consumer 
is still treated fairly.61 
D.  Examples and Comparisons of Online Consumer Contracts 
For illustrative purposes, compare the characteristics of Tumblr’s 
and Facebook’s terms of service (“TOS”) with that of Twitter’s. 
_____________________________ 
55. Tal Kastner, How ‘Bout Them Apples? The Power of Stories of Agreement 
in Consumer Contracts, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 67, 68 (2014) (revealing how agreements 
have manipulated consumers in the past). 
56. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 54, at 2. 
57. See id. at 5. 
58. See id. at 7. 
59. WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at 127. 
60. Contract’s Adaptation, supra note 22, at 1357. 
61. Adam Nyhan, In Business Contracts, Plain English is Better than Legalese, 
OPTICLIFF LAW (June 24, 2016, 12:10 PM), http://opticliff.com/business-contracts-
plain-english-better-legalese/. 
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Despite Tumblr’s TOS being more reasonable than many other social 
media services, Tumblr’s TOS still contain boilerplate rights-
foreclosure clauses such as: warranty disclaimers, limitations on 
liability, and choice of law.62 In its TOS, Tumblr encourages contacting 
the company before taking legal action in the event of a dispute, and 
surprisingly, there is no mandatory arbitration clause.63 Overall, 
Tumbler drafted its TOS in plain English, and most of its terms 
contained headings that described what each term below meant. For 
example, the modifications provision, meaning that terms are subject to 
future amendments, reads: “[a]s Tumblr grows and improves, we might 
have to make changes to these Terms of Service. When we do, we’ll let 
you know.”64 Additionally, Tumblr describes what type of data is 
collected in a more specific manner; for example, financial information 
is stored but not collected when a user makes a purchase.65 This 
readable and efficient style is trending amongst social media platforms. 
Although there is a current Facebook controversy, Facebook’s data 
policy appears interactive and friendly toward for users who can click 
on different terms that are written in plain English, thereby allowing 
them to understand the terms.66 Facebook has broad discretionary 
authority to collect and sell data. Under the “What kind of information 
do we collect?” link, the company states “[w]e collect the content and 
other information you provide when you use our Services, including 
when you sign up for an account, create or share, and message or 
communicate with others.”67 
Twitter’s TOS has two forms, one for the United States and one for 
other countries.68 The most important difference between the two is the 
limitations on liability clause. For the non-United States TOS, the 
limitations on liability clause applies to the maximum extent of the 
_____________________________ 
62. Terms of Service, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/terms-of-
service (last updated Sept. 26, 2017). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Privacy Policy, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/privacy (last 
updated June 13, 2017). 
66. Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last 
updated Sept. 29, 2016). 
67. Id. 
68. Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en (last updated 
Oct. 2, 2017). 
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applicable law, depending on the country the consumer is located in.69 
Most of the limitations on liabilities and warranties in the United States 
would not be enforceable in the EU (to be discussed further). The 
United States TOS contains a forum selection, choice of law, and 
consent to jurisdiction clauses (all-inclusively in San Francisco, CA), 
whereas the non-United States terms do not contain such clauses.70 Like 
Tumblr, however, this TOS does not contain a mandatory arbitration 
clause.71 The most recent trend is that consumer contracts, and 
specifically social media services, are transitioning towards becoming 
more consumer-friendly by becoming more visually appealing. Thus, 
some businesses recognize the benefits to this approach, despite the fact 
that plain-English consumer contracts are not legally required. 
Therefore, consumers and businesses both benefit from procedural and 
substantive reform. 
III.  WRAP CONTRACTS AND THE TRANSITION FROM TRADITIONAL 
CONTRACT DOCTRINE 
United States contract law is based on traditional contract doctrine, 
and wrap contracts fail to meet the requirements of traditional contract 
formation. A contract is a promise or set of promises for which the law 
recognizes both a duty to perform and a remedy to protect the parties’ 
expectations.72 A promise is a “manifestation of intention to act or 
refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promise 
in understanding that a commitment has been made.”73  Most 
contemporary consumer contracts are wrap contracts.74 
Wrap contracts are contracts that contain unilaterally imposed 
terms presented in a non-traditional form.75 In other words, the seller 
did not hand you a contract that you signed and delivered back to the 
seller. Instead, the drafter requires the non-drafting party to forfeit 
certain rights or take certain actions in order to access the product or 
_____________________________ 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
73. See id. § 2(1). 
74. WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at 2. 
75. Id. 
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], No. 1, Art. 14
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol54/iss1/14
Daiza camera ready (Do Not Delete) 7/10/2018  11:12 AM 
2017] WRAP CONTRACTS 215 
service.76 Wrap contracts include, among other forms, shrinkwrap, 
clickwrap, tapwrap, and browsewrap.77 Shrinkwraps are paper 
contracts that come with a product and the consumer accepts the 
contract after they purchased and opened the product (taking the plastic 
off, opening the box, etc.).78 Clickwraps are digital contracts that 
require clicking “I agree” to the terms to access the product or service.79 
Tapwraps are the same as clickwraps, but the consumer taps to agree.80 
Browsewraps are contracts that provide notice of the terms that apply 
to the consumer’s website activity via a hyperlink on the website.81 
Under the American Electronic Transactions Act, these online wrap 
contracts are enforceable even without an official electronic 
signature.82 
A.  Comparing Traditional Contract Law with Wrap Contracts 
The problem with wrap contracts is that consumers lack awareness 
of the terms in the contract, making it difficult to for consumer contracts 
to meet the elements of traditional contract doctrine.83 Traditional 
contract formation requires offer, acceptance, mutual assent, and 
consideration.84 An offer is an invitation of a promise or commitment 
_____________________________ 
76. Id. 
77. See id. at 3. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. See TradeComet.com L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that “‘clickwrap’ agreements that require a user to accept the 
agreement before proceeding are ‘reasonably communicated’ to the user”), aff’d, 647 
F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 2011). 
81. WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at 3. 
82. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(2) (2012) (“a signature, contract, or other record 
relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability 
solely because it is in electronic form.”). 
83. Ryan J. Casamiquela, Electronic Commerce: Contractual Assent and 
Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 495 (2002). 
84. See generally Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1673, 1708–19 (2007) (discussing how contracts should be 
interpreted as a transfer of ownership). 
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of future action or inaction.85 Acceptance is the manifestation of assent 
to the offeree’s terms in a manner requested or required by the offeror 
to accept the terms.86 An offer essentially creates the power of 
acceptance in the offeree.87Determining the moment in time of 
acceptance is important because that is when the contract becomes 
effective.88 Mutual assent, or a meeting of the minds, to the terms the 
parties set forth is an objective test, which can be created by action or 
inaction.89 Assent requires an offeree’s outward manifestation of the 
intent to engage in conduct, so that the offeror can infer that the offeree 
assents.90 Consideration is the final element whereby an “action in 
reliance upon a promise is sufficient reason for enforcement only when 
the action is bargained for by the promisor and given in return by the 
promisee.”91 Although sufficient notice of the offer is essential for 
obtaining acceptance in wrap contracts, notice itself is not an element 
of contract formation.92 
The differences between wrap contracts and traditional contract 
doctrine arise out of advancements in technology. Sufficient notice is 
virtually the only requirement for wrap contracts.93 Sufficient notice 
requires consent, and consent cradles offer, acceptance and 
consideration into one blanket—foregoing the usual analysis of whether 
there was offer, acceptance, mutual assent, and consideration.94 In the 
online context, consent essentially exists when there is no active 
rejection of the terms.95 Thus, consent has become a superfluous 
concept. 
_____________________________ 
85. See Carolyn M. Edwards, Contract Formation Under Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 215, 218 (1977); see also U.C.C. § 2-
206(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). 
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 52(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1973); 
U.C.C. § 2-206(2) cmt. 3.  
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 35 (AM. LAW. INST. 1932).  
88. Edwards, supra note 85, at 234. 
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
90. Id. 
91. Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903). 
92. U.C.C. § 2-206, cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (“[I]t 
is essential that notice follow in due course to constitute acceptance.”). 
93. WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at 93–94. 
94. Id. at 109. 
95. Id. 
16
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In traditional contract doctrine, silence does not constitute 
acceptance because it is not an active manifestation of intent, but in 
wrap contracts, silence is a form of acceptance.96 If silence equates to 
acceptance, then the only question to consider is whether sufficient 
notice was provided. The standard for notice in traditional contract 
doctrine is whether a reasonably prudent person standing in the shoes 
of the offeree would accept the contract.97 However, in wrap contracts, 
the reasonable person does not read the terms, nor do they have the legal 
background necessary to understand how rights-foreclosure terms 
operate.98 Thus, an objective standard of the reasonably prudent offeree 
is somewhat superficial. 
B.  Case Law Timeline Regarding Wrap Contract Formation 
To find sufficient notice in wrap contracts, courts look at the 
presentation of the agreement and website design.99 Because notice is a 
fact-intensive analysis, inconsistent holdings among jurisdictions may 
encourage or discourage plaintiffs to test their specific set of facts.100 
In ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the first landmark wrap contracts 
case, the Seventh Circuit held a license shrinkwrap agreement as 
enforceable.101 The court relied on the UCC, concluding that if the 
buyer fails to effectively reject the goods received, the buyer accepts 
the goods.102 According to the court, Zeidenberg inspected the package, 
used the software, learned of the license agreement, did not return the 
software, and therefore accepted the terms of the license agreement 
based on actual notice.103 The court also employed a public policy 
analysis and determined the license was extremely important to 
ProCD’s business, as ProCD’s software could be stolen if the contract 
_____________________________ 
96. Id. at 110. 
97. Id. at 111. 
98. See MICHAEL L. RUSTAD & THOMAS H. KOENIG, SOFTWARE LICENSING, 
CLOUD COMPUTING AGREEMENTS, OPEN SOURCE, & INTERNET TERMS OF USE § 9.04 
(2016) (“The chief purpose of a terms of use agreement is to use contract law to protect 
their rights while eliminating the remedies of the user community.”). 
99. Nancy Kim, Online Contracting, 72 THE BUS. LAW. 243, 247 (2016–2017).  
100. WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at 114. 
101. 86 F.3d 1447, 1448 (7th Cir. 1996). 
102. Id. at 1452–53. 
103. Id. at 1453. 
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was held to be unenforceable.104 Because of the elasticity of the market 
at the time—software was a new concept—the only way to profit was 
to offer an attractive price, even though the cost of that type of business 
was especially high during this time period.105 Thus, the court was 
concerned consumers would have to pay more for software programs 
because ProCD, and perhaps other software sellers, would increase its 
price to address these legal concerns.106 The court held that 
Zeidenberg’s acceptance of ProCD’s software and the shrinkwrap 
license created an enforceable contract.107 
As more decisions are issued, specific nuances distinguish one case 
from another, making it difficult to know whether a given contract will 
be enforceable. For example, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the 
TOS appeared after the transaction was made, but because the plaintiff 
used the service daily and was aware the TOS existed, the contract was 
enforced.108 Comparatively, in Specht v. Netscape Communications 
Corp., a landmark browsewrap case decided in 2002, the Second 
Circuit held that requiring users to scroll down the website to find the 
hyperlink to the browsewrap license agreement rendered insufficient 
notice.109 Recently, in Nicosia v. Amazon.com, the Second Circuit held 
that clicking a button to complete the transaction, with a hyperlink to 
the terms found immediately below the button, also rendered 
insufficient notice.110 The hyperlink to Amazon’s terms was located on 
the order page, below the “[r]eview your order” button, in small font 
that stated: “[b]y placing your order, you agree to Amazon.com’s 
privacy notice and conditions of use.”111 “Privacy notice” and 
“conditions of use” appeared in blue font, indicating clickable links to 
separate pages.112 Unlike a typical clickwrap agreement (where user 
must click, “I agree”), “[p]lace your order” did not put a reasonably 
_____________________________ 
104. Id. at 1449. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 1451. 
107. Id. 
108. 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004). 
109. 306 F.3d 17, 30–31 (2d Cir. 2002). 
110. See  834 F.3d 220, 238 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that reasonable minds could 
disagree on what constitutes reasonable notice when the terms are inconspicuous). 
111. Id. at 236. 
112. Id. 
18
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prudent user on notice that he or she was assenting to the term because 
it did not contain language that clicking the button meant accepting the 
terms.113 
In Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., the Southern District of New York 
upheld Facebook’s clickwrap agreement based on the assumption that 
a reasonably prudent Facebook user would understand the 
consequences of clicking the “Sign Up” button.114 Even though in small 
print and located just below the “Sign Up” button, there was a statement 
that said clicking the button meant agreeing to Facebook’s terms of 
service.115 Comparatively, in Berkson v. Gogo, LLC, the Eastern 
District of New York concluded that the hyperlink to the TOU was 
presented in a deceivingly different way than the “sign in” hyperlink, 
where users could merely check mark the box “‘I agree to the Terms of 
Use,’ and/or ‘I would like to receive email offers and news from 
Gogo,’” rendering the TOU unenforceable.116 Unlike the “sign in” 
button, which was in all caps, large font, bold, and accessible from 
multiple locations on the website, the hyperlink to the TOU had none 
of those features, as it was in small font and only accessible from the 
one location on the website.117 Gogo’s intent was likely to provide as 
much notice as possible for users to sign up, but little notice of the TOU. 
The essential difference between the notice provided by Facebook and 
Gogo was the language that Facebook expressly included, which was 
that clicking the “sign up” button meant accepting its TOU. Otherwise, 
both had small font that was somewhat inconspicuous, and both 
required users to click a separate link to read the TOU. 
The Second Circuit in Meyer v. Uber Techs, Inc., on August 17, 
2017, held that clicking “Register” was sufficient clickwrap assent to 
Uber’s terms and privacy policies that were located in hyperlinks below 
the “Register” button.118 After completing the Payment screen, the 
prospective user must click “Register” to access the App.119 Below the 
_____________________________ 
113. Id. at 236–37. 
114. See 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Huber v. Dell 
Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 122 (Ill. App. 2005)). 
115. Id. at 834. 
116. 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 370, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
117. Id. 
118. 868 F.3d 66, 71 (2nd Cir. 2017). 
119. Id. 
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input fields and buttons on that payment screen is black text that advises 
users, “[b]y creating an Uber account, you agree to the TERMS OF 
SERVICE & PRIVACY POLICY.”120 From here, a hyperlink directs 
users to Uber’s TOS and Privacy Policy.121 Because of the text advising 
users of the links to the TOS, the Second Circuit held that Uber 
provided users with sufficient notice.122 Notably, this case was factually 
similar to the Fteja holding, and the result was essentially the same. 
But, the Meyer holding in the Second Circuit reversed the Southern 
District of New York, where the Second Circuit held that there was 
sufficient notice of the TOS from the statement, “[b]y creating an Uber 
account, you agree to the TERMS OF SERVICE & PRIVACY 
POLICY,” disregarding the district court’s analysis that such statement 
was not highlighted and was barely legible.123 Meyer also reversed the 
district court by holding that users did not need to affirmatively click to 
agree to the terms of service because a reasonable user was on notice 
that clicking meant agreeing to the terms.124 
In 2016, the Seventh Circuit in Sgouros v. TransUnion, Corp., the 
same circuit as ProCD, held that TransUnion’s arbitration clause was 
unenforceable.125 On the second page of the sign-up sheet, after filling 
out credit card information, was a button, “I Accept & Continue to Step 
3.”126 By clicking the button, the user was not required to click on the 
scroll box or scroll down to view the service agreement.127 Instead, the 
scrollbox contained a hyperlink that led to the service agreement that 
the user would need to click to view and the arbitration clause was 
placed on page eight of a ten page agreement.128 
Comparatively, on February 24, 2017, a court of the Northern 
District of California, in Devries v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., granted a 
motion to compel arbitration, enforcing Experian’s online 
_____________________________ 
120. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
121. Id. 
122. See id. at 78–79. 
123. Meyer v. Kalanick, 199 F. Supp. 3d 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), overruled 
by Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2nd Cir. 2017). 
124. Id. at 760–62. 
125. See Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 
2016). 
126. Id. at 1033.  
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
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agreement.129 The arbitration clause in the agreement waived the user’s 
right to jury trial and class-wide arbitration.130 In the class action 
lawsuit, Devries, on behalf of the class, claimed that he attempted to 
obtain a free credit report from www.annualcreditreport.experian.com 
by filling out personal information, when he got transferred to another 
website and was denied the credit report because his identity could not 
be confirmed.131 Devries then filled out personal information on the 
Experian website (www.experian.com), resulting in him having to 
purchase the credit report for ten dollars.132 The suit alleged violation 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the California Consumer Legal 
Remedies Act, California’s Unfair Competition, and other related 
violations.133 To complete the transactions, he had to click “Submit my 
secure order,” which contained this sentence underneath: “[c]lick 
‘Submit Secure Order’ to accept the Terms and Conditions above, 
acknowledge receipt of our Privacy Notice and agree to its terms, 
confirm your authorization for Consumerlnfo.com, Inc., an Experian 
company, to obtain your credit report and submit your secure order.”134 
In its holding, the court cited Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., stating that 
Experian’s notice was sufficient because clicking a button that appeared 
near a hyperlink to the TOS indicated acceptance of the TOS to a 
reasonable person.135 This result was surprising because the users were 
transferred multiple times and then had to pay for what plaintiffs 
thought was a free credit report. It seems as if the Devries court may 
have had reservations about the Nicosia holding, even though the terms 
and conditions were also presented in a confusing manner, and instead 
seemed to align with the Fteja and Meyer holdings (though at the time 
of the holding, this case distinguished itself from Meyer, because the 
Meyer case was at the district level).136 
_____________________________ 
129. Devries v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 16-cv-02953-WHO, 2017 WL 
733096, at *7, *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017). 
130. Id. at *2. 
131. Id. at *1. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at *4. 
134. Id. at *5 (internal quotations omitted). 
135. Id. at *6–7 (citing Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 13-cv-05682-LHK, 
2014 WL 2903752, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014), aff’d, 840 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 
2016)). 
136. Id. at *8–10. 
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IV.  OTHER APPROACHES UTILIZED OR PROPOSED TO ADVANCE 
CONSUMER RIGHTS AND CONSISTENCY 
Other nations have taken different approaches in an effort to curtail 
many of the problems described in this comment. Whether we need 
stricter consumer protection laws or oversight through administrative 
agencies, different approaches and theories should be analyzed to 
determine what practical protections best suit the United States. 
A.  European Union Directive’s Consumer Protection Laws 
The best example of consumer protection laws is the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive of 1993 (“UCTD”) of the European Union. 
The UCTD was enacted in response to the prevalence of unfair practices 
with non-negotiated contracts amid the advancements in technology. 
The European Union Directive “acknowledges that standard-form 
contracting is efficient, but regulatory oversight is necessary so that 
‘abuses can be prevented.’”137 The UCTD and UCP (“Unfair 
Commercial Practices”), implemented in New Zealand, Canada and all 
twenty-eight Member States of the European Union, provide protection 
for achieving substantive consumer justice.138 
Under the UCTD, a term in a contract is unenforceable if the terms 
(1) are non-negotiable, (2) create significant imbalance between the 
rights of the parties, and (3) that imbalance is contrary to good faith.139 
_____________________________ 
137. Council Directive 93/13, of the Council of the European Economic 
Communities of Apr. 5, 1993, on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 
95) [hereinafter UCTD]. 
138. Contracting Practices, supra note 6, at 1494–95; James P. Nehf, Book 
Review: European Fair Trading Law: The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 
35 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 305, 306 (2007) (“The focus of [UCP] is almost entirely on 
prohibiting deceptive and ‘aggressive’ selling behavior that can influence consumer 
decisions.”); see also Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke 
to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic 
Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 452, 454–56 (2013) [hereinafter Lord Coke] (discussing 
the evolving interpretation of internet and electronic contracts among United States 
courts).  
139. Contracting Practices, supra note 6, at 1509–11 (explaining that the 
UCTD imposes a duty of readability, so “contracts must be drafted in plain and 
22
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The UCTD goes beyond disclosure and readability, and blacklists (or 
prohibits) certain clauses and graylists suspect clauses, meaning these 
terms are presumed to be unfair because they unreasonably shift risk to 
the consumer (under Annex I of the EU’s Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive “UCP”).140 The UCP blacklists the following clauses 
whenever they appear as non-negotiable: choice of forum; choice of 
law; disclaimer of warranties; browsewrap or clickwrap contract 
formation; rolling contracts (most of the terms come after the 
transaction has been consummated); pre-dispute mandatory arbitration; 
class action waivers; limitations of remedies or caps; and reduced 
statute of limitations.141 United States businesses that offer a product or 
service internationally must adjust their contracts for countries with 
stricter consumer protection laws than the United States (such as Japan, 
which does not enforce shrinkwrap license agreements).142 For 
example, Twitter has two different TOU; one for those in the United 
States, and one for those outside the United States.143 The UCTD is 
considered a minimum standard, so member states have wide discretion 
regarding enforcing even more stringent requirements on businesses; 
thus, businesses that operate worldwide must comply with these nation-
specific standards.144 
The UCTD requires “contract terms to be drafted in plain and 
intelligible language, and states that ambiguities shall be interpreted in 
_____________________________ 
intelligible language,” and the UCTD grants Member states—through courts, 
consumer administrative agencies, or other proper authorities— the discretion to 
strike down terms or the agreement as a whole if terms are unreadable or oppressive).  
140. Id. at 1503, 1509; see UCTD, supra note 137 (“The Directive on Consumer 
Rights (2011/83/EC) replaces, as of June, 13 2014, Directive 97/7/EC on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts and Directive 85/577/EEC 
“to protect consumer[s] in respect of contracts negotiated away from business 
premises.”). 
141. Directive 2005/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
May 11, 2005 on Unfair Commercial Practices and Amending Council Directives 
84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, and 2002/65/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 [hereinafter the UCP]; 
Contracting Practices, supra note 6, at 1510–11. 
142. Contracting Practices, supra note 6, at 1494. 
143. See supra Part II.D. 
144. Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer 
Terms of Use for a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1085, 1134–
36 (2012). 
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favor of consumers.”145 The UCTD does, however, follow the basic 
United States duty to read doctrine.146 Regarding enforcement and 
analysis of UCTD, member state courts and consumer agencies may 
review all non-negotiated contracts to determine fairness in the terms 
of the contracts, taking into account the market from the time of contract 
formation until contract conclusion.147 When analyzing whether a term 
is enforceable, for example, the European Court of Justice, under the 
UCTD, can invoke a sua sponte assessment of whether a contract term 
is unfair.148 Graylisted terms have a presumption of unfairness, but the 
unfairness can be overcome, depending on the surrounding 
circumstances.149 This type of oversight, in addition to improving the 
balance between consumers and businesses, has provided clarity and 
confidence to both parties, because businesses are deterred from 
utilizing their superior bargaining power in a manner that oppresses 
parties who lack such power.150 
B.  Administrative Agencies 
Another approach that has been implemented is the use of an 
administrative agency (like the FTC) that evaluates and approves 
contracts, such as the Israeli Standard Contract Tribunal.151 The 
approval agency certifies that the contract does not contain terms 
unduly disadvantageous to buyers.152 Once approved, a contract cannot 
be judicially invalidated for a period of up to five years.153 On its face, 
the pre-approval option appears attractive for buyers and sellers; for 
sellers, it provides legal certainty, and for buyers, a third party 
undertakes the burden of evaluating whether a reasonably prudent 
_____________________________ 
145. Id. at 1135. 
146. Bakos, Marrota-Wurgler & Trosson, supra note 8, at 2. 
147. UCTD, supra note 137, at art. 4(1). 
148. Maud Piers, Spillovers of European Consumer Law: Validity of Arbitration 
Agreements . . . and Beyond, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 625, 630–31 (2011). 
149. Rustad & Onufrio, supra note 144, at 1136. 
150. Id. at 1188–89. 
151. Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 
HOUS. L. REV. 975, 984 (2005) (conceptualizing the idea of the Federal Trade 
Commission as a contract approval agency). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 984–85. 
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buyer would reject the terms.154 This creates a safe harbor for sellers, 
as one seller’s approved contract would presumably immunize other 
sellers in the same line of business from judicial evaluation and 
invalidation.155 However, this system also enables competitors to save 
legal costs by “free-riding” off the approval procedures already 
undertaken by the competitor that received approval.156 Additionally, 
the industry would become centralized because competing sellers 
would simply utilize the same contract.157 It is no surprise that even in 
a smaller country like Israel, there is limited use of the pre-approval 
process.158 However, this administrative agency would be a drastic 
institutional reform in the United States, complicating our contract law 
even further and curtailing our judicial system. 
C.  Specific Assent 
One procedural reform suggested by Professor Nancy Kim is 
requiring specific assent to all material and rights-foreclosure clauses 
in clickwrap agreements.159 Wrap contracts contain blanket assent, the 
all-or-nothing provision in which the contract is formed entirely if there 
is an opportunity to read.160 However, in this proposal, for each rights-
foreclosure provision, the non-drafting party must click “I agree.”161 
This would require consumers to at least look at the rights-foreclosure 
terms because they would have to click to consent to them.162 
Moreover, businesses would be less inclined to sneak in unconscionable 
terms, knowing more users would see them. For businesses, this is 
beneficial because this would negate most arguments that the non-
drafting party did not have an opportunity to read. It would create more 
uniformity and less uncertainty as part of a cost-effective solution. This 
_____________________________ 
154. Id. at 986–87. 
155. Id. at 988. 
156. Id. at 989. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Contract’s Adaptation, supra note 22, at 1341 (deriving from Karl 
Llewellyn’s theory of blanket assent that unreasonable contract terms should still be 
held unenforceable despite assent to those terms). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
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proposal acknowledges that clickwrap assent (as opposed to 
browsewrap assent) provides for an efficient opportunity to review, as 
it requires active participation by the consumer. 
D.  How Unconscionability Has Been Enforced 
Unconscionability has two components, procedural and 
substantive. These two components provide courts with flexibility 
regarding how they enforce the doctrine. Unconscionability is a key 
aspect of consumer protection, especially in the context of wrap 
contracts. 
1.  The Sliding Scale Approach 
Another suggested reform is for all state jurisdictions to engage in 
a less stringent analysis of unconscionability. Twelve state supreme 
courts have already diluted the standard of unconscionability into a 
sliding scale approach.163 Applying the sliding scale, unconscionability 
is analyzed in tandem, meaning that the more oppressive the procedural 
or substantive prong appears, the less evidence of the other prong one 
needs to meet the unconscionability standard.164 Both prongs are still 
required, but the analysis is less rigorous if one prong does not meet the 
same level of unconscionability as the other prong.165 
There are a minority of jurisdictions that do away with dual 
requirements of procedural and substantive unconscionability, 
requiring only one of the two.166 The majority view is still that 
procedural and substantive unconscionability must both be present; 
however, the recent sliding scale trend is the more flexible standard that 
etches closer to the minority approach, requiring only one prong.167 The 
_____________________________ 
163. Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The 
Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 6, 11 (2012). 
164. Id. at 12.  
165. Id. at 18, 57–58. 
166. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 
2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 843 (2016) (suggesting important 
amendments to U.C.C. Article 2, such as disclosures and unconscionability 
asymmetry). 
167. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 
2000) (holding that a non-negotiated and mandatory arbitration term in an 
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sliding scale approach, while less stringent than the majority, still 
remains difficult to meet, because it is challenging to include both 
substantive and procedural unconscionability, even if one is more 
severe than the other.168 
Under the minority approach, courts have used procedural 
unconscionability as a mechanism to invalidate many consumer 
contracts for their adhesive nature, which is why the trend seems to 
prefer the sliding scale approach.169 Under the sliding scale approach, 
such as under California law, the court may engage first a procedural, 
then substantive analysis, so as to make it a bit easier to find 
unconscionability.170 Because substantive unconscionability is a very 
high standard, defined as whether the terms would “shock the 
conscience” (the contract or specific clause provides for unreasonable 
risk allocation that is too harsh or one-sided, i.e. no reasonable person 
would agree to such a term), making it difficult to meet.171 Procedural 
unconscionability touches on contract readability concerns and assesses 
the bargaining strength of the drafting party (including whether it is a 
contract of adhesion).172 Thus, procedural unconscionability may be 
_____________________________ 
employment contract was unenforceable, while citing to the sliding scale approach to 
unconscionability in 15 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1763A 226–27 (3d ed. 1972)). 
168. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1135 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“To determine whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable under Florida law, 
courts must look to: (1) the manner in which the contract was entered into; (2) the 
relative bargaining power of the parties and whether the complaining party had a 
meaningful choice at the time the contract was entered into; (3) whether the terms 
were merely presented on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis; and (4) the complaining party’s 
ability and opportunity to understand the disputed terms of the contract.”) (citing 
Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)). 
169. See generally Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the 
Law of Cyberspace: Electronic Contracting Cases 2006–2007, 63 BUS. LAW. 219, 
224–30 (2007) (discussing how courts applied the concept of procedural 
unconscionability). 
170. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 2011) (providing for the flexible 
enforcement of unconscionability so “as to avoid an unconscionable result.”); Little 
v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 983 (Cal. 2003); Lonegrass, supra note 163, at 12.  
171. Wayne v. Staples, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 556–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that there was no procedural or substantive unconscionability, because the 
price was disclosed, buyers had a meaningful choice in the marketplace, and the price 
did not shock the conscience). 
172. See Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); 
Gentry v. Super. Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 572 (Cal. 2007). 
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found in analyzing the fine print, convoluted and unclear language, or 
through a lack of sufficient notice.173 As earlier demonstrated, most 
cases focus on whether there was sufficient notice of the contract 
(engaging in a procedural analysis first), and if disputes arise, 
consumers must use unconscionability as a shield as an attempt to 
render the term(s) unenforceable. 
Sliding scale unconscionability, while helpful in some 
circumstances, is a defense to invalidate a contract. Conscionability is 
not an affirmative duty, so businesses need only concern themselves of 
the possibilities of litigation and may bend the rules, hoping that no one 
will challenge the enforceability of the contract. Moreover, 
unconscionability is confusing because there are not clear guidelines to 
businesses regarding what is acceptable or not, except for the rare 
circumstances when courts have already held certain consumer 
contracts or terms unenforceable. When a court finds procedural and/or 
substantive unconscionability, the court may (1) refuse to enforce the 
entire contract, (2) enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause or clauses, or (3) limit the application of the 
unconscionable clause so as to avoid the unconscionable results.174 
Overall, unconscionability generally assumes the contract has 
already been formed and then questions the practices of the business.175 
Instead, courts should be more proactive and apply unconscionability 
as a bar to contract formation at the outset. In contract formation, a duty 
to read is imposed on the consumer, and a duty to provide sufficient 
notice is imposed on the business. If we consider unconscionability 
after the fact, then this is a dispute that could have been addressed prior 
to contract formation. Unconscionability in practice is invoked by the 
consumer by arguing that although the consumer is now aware of the 
contract terms, the court should not enforce such term(s). The SCCA 
will expand on how courts can invoke unconscionability in a more 
proactive sense, graylisting certain unconscionable terms and shifting 
_____________________________ 
173. See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(holding an arbitration clause was not unconscionable despite the fact that it was on 
the reverse page of the agreement and the parties had unequal bargaining power) 
(citing Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145 (Pa. 1985)). 
174. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1952) 
(principles of federal unconscionability); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 2011) 
(principles of unconscionability in California). 
175. WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at 113. 
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the burden on the business to prove the term is conscionable, and by 
imposing a duty on businesses to draft readable, noticeable, and fair 
contracts, which will otherwise be unenforceable if not followed. 
2.  United States Supreme Court and California Courts’ on 
Unconscionability 
California courts have applied the sliding scale standard for 
unconscionability for over twenty years.176 In an important case that 
invoked unconscionability and was later overruled, in Gatton v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., the Court emphasized the “important role of class 
action remedies in California law” and the importance of the class 
action device for vindicating rights asserted by large groups of persons, 
which is what many consumer contracts entail.177 Gatton, following the 
Discover Bank rule, held that class action waivers in non-negotiable 
consumer contracts are unenforceable when small damages renders 
individual arbitration to be an impractical mechanism for relief.178 
In response to the holding above, AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, a 2011 United States Supreme Court case, held that the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempted the holdings of Discover 
Bank and Armendariz, stating they conflicted with the FAA’s purpose 
of ensuring the option of private arbitration regardless of whether the 
contract was negotiable or not.179 The Supreme Court emphasized that 
despite FAA’s preemption, contractual defenses such as fraud, duress, 
undue influence, and unconscionability must still be available to 
_____________________________ 
176. See West v. Henderson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570, 575–76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 295 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); 
Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
177. Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 350–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007) (agreeing that class action waivers in consumer contracts for small damage 
claims are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable) (quoting Discover 
Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005)). In 2005, the Supreme Court of 
California, in Discover Bank, held consumer contracts cannot require class action 
waivers because such waivers are inherently unconscionable, as the consumer is not 
provided a reasonable opportunity to seek relief. 
178. Id. at 580–81 (holding there was substantive unconscionability because T-
Mobile hid termination fees imposed on consumers and then tried to enforce class 
action waiver; but, the small amount of damages rendered individual claims 
untenable). 
179. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
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invalidate certain mandatory arbitration agreements.180 The Supreme 
Court upheld this decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, stating that the economic hardship for an individual to 
vindicate his or her claim in individual arbitration does not mean class 
action waivers in totality violate public policy.181 
On April 6, 2017, the California Supreme Court in McGill v. 
Citibank, N.A., held that an arbitration clause waiving the right to seek 
a statutory remedy was unenforceable.182 The arbitration clause 
contained a waiver of the right to seek public injunctive relief (public 
injunctive relief is not a class action but has the underlying result of 
benefitting the general welfare), which violated California’s laws on 
Unfair Competition, False Advertising, and the Consumers Legal 
Remedies Act.183 The California Supreme Court distinguished the facts 
from Concepcion. It is true that a class action does not alter substantive 
law; instead, it is a procedural device that simply aggregates claims, but 
public injunctive relief is a substantive right that cannot be waived 
unless negotiated for.184 While the FAA does not prevent parties who 
have agreed to arbitrate from also agreeing to exclude certain claims 
from arbitration, the parties cannot agree to exclude public injunctive 
relief premised on the faulty argument that it is class relief; thus, the 
California Supreme Court distinguishes between the two.185 
All states are required to follow FAA, but state laws can still 
invalidate mandatory arbitration in certain circumstances, such as in the 
case of DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, where the mandatory arbitration 
clause did not waive class actions when at the time the contract was 
formed, the Discover Bank rule was still in effect.186 It is also notable 
_____________________________ 
180. Id. at 350. 
181. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 251–52 (2013). 
182. McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85, 86 (Cal. 2017).  
183. Id. at 87; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq. (West 2017) 
(California Unfair Competition Law); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 et seq. (West 2009 & 
Supp. 2018) (California Consumers Legal Remedies Act); BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
17500 et seq. (West 2017) (California False Advertising Law). 
184. McGill, 393 P.3d at 97. 
185. Id. 
186. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 467–68 (2015) (“Congress in 
1925 could not have anticipated that the Court would apply the FAA to render 
consumer adhesion contracts invulnerable to attack by parties who never 
meaningfully agreed to arbitration in the first place.”) 
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that on May 21, 2018, the Supreme Court held the interpretation of 
employees able to be engaged in “concerted activity” under the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) as preempted by the FAA, 
when employees waive their rights to class actions in their employment 
contract.187 The FAA savings clause, which can remove mandatory 
arbitration obligations when arbitration conflicts with federal law, does 
not salvage alleged class actions alleged to be included in NLRA. 
Because arbitration and class actions have been actively litigated, 
especially by the Supreme Court, SCCA defers to the Supreme Court 
on these two major issues.188 
E.  Current United States Consumer Rights Legislation 
In 1975, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Consumer 
Warranty Act (“MMWA”) to “improve the adequacy of information 
available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in 
the marketing of consumer products . . . .”189 This federal law imposes 
a duty on all warrantors of consumer products to “fully and 
conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the 
terms and conditions of such warranty.”190 However, MMCWA is not 
enough to protect consumers’ substantive rights, as it only focuses on 
the warranty of products being conspicuous and readable. There have 
been other attempts to improve consumer laws, such the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”), which requires 
licensors to provide the consumer the opportunity to review the license 
_____________________________ 
187. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16–285, 2018 WL 2292444, at *10–11, 
17 (U.S. May 21, 2018). 
188. The Supreme Court is rendering a major decision, one that—like the 
FAA—will likely preempt state law just as arbitration did under the FAA in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) and Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). Section 7 of the NLRA states: “Employees shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities 
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring 
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in 
section 158(a)(3).” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  
189. 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (2012). 
190. Id.; see also Contracting Practices, supra note 6, at 1467. 
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agreement prior to consenting (as opposed to shrinkwraps, which allow 
for an agreement after the consumer has accepted the product).191 Only 
two states enacted UCITA.192 There was also an attempt to reform 
software contracts by the American Legal Institute, called the Principles 
of the Law of Software Contracts (“Principles”).193 The goal was to 
“clarify and unify the laws of software transactions.”194 The Principles 
are helpful factors in analyzing the enforceability of a software license, 
but procedurally, the Principles will not become law unless jurisdictions 
adopt it and use its analysis in their holdings.195 
Legislative routes have had some success in protecting consumers. 
The Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016 (“CRFA”) is a federal 
statute that voids any consumer contract that disallows performance 
assessments by imposing penalties against individuals who engage in 
such communications.196 Thus, consumers may engage in written, oral, 
pictorial, or other similar performance assessments of goods, services, 
or conduct of a person or business without waiving such right.197 The 
statute was inspired by California’s no non-disparagement statute.198 
The California statute, enacted September 9, 2014, imposes civil 
_____________________________ 
191. See generally David A. Szwak, Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions ACT [U.C.I.T.A.]: The Consumer’s Perspective, 63 LA. L. REV. 27, 28–
32 (2002); Lord Coke, supra note 138, at 463–65. 
192. Lord Coke, supra note 138, at 489 (only Virginia and Maryland adopted 
the UCITA into law).  
193. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Principles of the Law of 
Software Contracts: Some Highlights, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1519, 1531 (2010); 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 1.09 crnt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 
2010) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (“Factors a court should consider in deciding 
whether to hold a term of an agreement unenforceable include: (1) whether the 
agreement effectively expands the scope of the transferor’s rights or contracts the 
scope of the transferee’s rights to its own creations under federal law; (2) whether the 
agreement was negotiated and the parties’ relative bargaining power; (3) whether and 
to what degree enforcement of the provision is likely to affect competition adversely; 
(4) whether and to what degree enforcement of the provision is likely to affect 
innovation adversely; and (5) whether the transferee has the opportunity to obtain the 
software free of the restriction at a reasonable price.”).  
194. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at introductory cmt. 
195. Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 193, at 1520. 
196. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, H.R. 5111, 114th Cong. (2015–
2016) (enacted). 
197. Id. 
198. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.8 (West Supp. 2018). 
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penalties for consumer contracts that contain provisions waiving the 
“consumer’s right to make any statement regarding the seller or lessor 
or its employees or agents, or concerning the goods or services.”199 The 
goal of this comment’s proposal, which is influenced by the UCTD and 
UCP, is to mirror the same institutional process as California’s no non-
disparagement statute and the CRFA. 
V.  THE PROPOSAL OF “THE SIMPLIFIED CONSUMER CONTRACTS ACT” 
As referenced by the UCC, CRFA, and the MMWA, the legislative 
route has been a successful institutional reform mechanism. A contract 
should be clear, noticeable, and reflect the drafter’s intent. A contract 
should also have reasonable terms that: (1) provide businesses with 
clear guidelines on what they can and cannot do, and (2) provide more 
balance between the contracting parties. This comment proposes 
substantive and procedural reform of consumer contracts as well as 
modifications to how these contracts are presented. The proposal is 
titled, The Simplified Consumer Contracts Act (“SCCA”). 
A.  The Procedural Reform 
All non-negotiated consumer contracts in non-paper form (or 
online contracts) will require: (1) plain English, meaning the standard 
for an entire agreement is scored at approximately sixty on the Flesch 
Readability Ease Scale;200 (2) all terms and conditions must be 
contained either on one website location, or in one scrollbox;201 (3) each 
_____________________________ 
199. Id. 
200. A score of sixty is reasonable as it is the approximate reading 
comprehension level of an individual in high school. There would be some margin of 
error to allow for less than a standard of sixty to avoid being hyper-technical, but it is 
important to have a standard that is mathematical. Otherwise, what is reasonable will 
be too open to interpretation. The margin of error is not a brightline rule but should 
be generally not less than fifty-seven. 
201. Users will no longer be required to click several links or read through a 
number of different contracts located on separate pages. For example, a Terms and 
Conditions, Privacy Policy, and Data Policy total too many agreements for an average 
user to click through and expect to be bound to. Consumers are set up for failure 
because multiple binding contracts are overwhelming and difficult to digest. This is 
especially concerning when consumers use a product or service only once. With 
identity theft being a prevalent concern in all industries, it is important that consumers 
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clause or term must contain a heading, with a sentence, sentences, or 
phrase below that summarizes that term, making the terms easy to 
skim;202 (4) that clickwrap assent be required and be located on the 
webpage or box where the terms are contained;203 (5) should the 
business modify any terms of the agreement, there must be new 
clickwrap assent for those updated terms;204 (6) the font-size of the 
_____________________________ 
have quick and easy access to the contract that will govern their dispute, in the event 
one arises. 
202. Plain English is easier to skim than legalese. Headings and the summary 
below, worded in concise language, will also contribute to the readability of online 
contracts. First, the agreements would state that the webpage or scrollbox consists of 
binding and irrevocable contract. Second, there would be a description of the rights 
and limitations of the parties when using the product or service. For example, if 
software includes a license to use, the contract would first describe the grant to use 
the license and the exclusivity regarding distribution of the license. Third, rights-
foreclosure provisions such as: mandatory arbitration clauses, jury trial waivers, class 
action waivers, limitations on liability, limitations on remedies, and choice of 
law/forum clauses would be included after. It would be helpful to include a heading 
that clearly states, “Rights that You Are Giving Up,” and then name each rights-
foreclosure clause. For example, under the “Rights that You Are Giving Up” heading, 
a sub-heading below could state “Class Action Waiver.” The sentence below could 
read: “You waive your right to join any actions you may have against [insert company 
here] for any circumstances. This means you can only file a claim individually and 
this applies to any action arising out of this agreement.” The full clause would be 
located directly below the heading summary. Other boilerplate provisions that are less 
oppressive, such as severability, modifications, notices, recitals, terminations, 
integrations, counterparts, etc., should be listed at the end of the agreement. 
203. The user must click to agree to the terms. The language should be clear, 
such as “I agree to the terms and conditions,” or “By clicking here, I agree to the terms 
and conditions.” This would eliminate browsewrap entirely. Thus, online (or non-
paper) contracts would be solely clickwrap or tapwrap. 
204. This means that any modification would require new assent by the 
consumer, and therefore, would require the consumer to click to agree to the 
modifications. Without new assent, the user is not bound to new modifications. The 
user would be bound the contract the consumer agreed to. If a consumer does not 
agree to the new terms, the business can block access to any updates. For example, 
just recently, Snapchat updated its terms of service and privacy policy. Users were 
required to click “I agree” to use Snapchat. Without agreeing, the user did not have 
access to the new Snapchat update. Not all businesses need to or should block access, 
but this is one strategy that follows the requirements stated here. However, the concern 
here is that consumers would lose access unless they agree to the terms, which 
essentially forces them to be bound to the modification. While we prefer businesses 
do not block access, it is their right to bind users into contracts (so long as they are 
not blocking access that has been paid for through a certain date and on different 
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words should be in either 12-point font or a comparably similarly sized 
font;205 and, (7) the total word length of the content must be 
proportional to the type of the agreement being entered into.206 All non-
negotiated contracts in paper form would have the same requirements, 
with the exception of clickwrap assent. For those non-online form, such 
as with shrinkwraps, the agreements would be enforceable so long as 
there is some method to accept the terms (such as a signature). 
This proposal will also complement California’s Consumers Legal 
Remedies Act (“CLRA”), which provides a laundry list of unfair or 
deceptive practices undertaken by a person in a transaction and the 
remedies available to that person.207 Because the purpose of the CLRA 
is for businesses to not engage in unfair and deceptive practices, the 
SCCA would fill in gaps left out by the CLRA because the remedies 
_____________________________ 
terms). The substantive reform of this proposal addresses the concern of being forced 
to agree to unconscionable terms in case that issue arises.  
205. Size 12-point font is not required. However, 12-point font, preferably in 
Times New Roman, would fulfill the requirement and thus lower the business’s risk 
of liability. The font size should be readable and not considerably deviate from 12-
point. The reason for this is important—if a user is accessing an App and notice to the 
Terms and Conditions are hidden at the bottom in unreasonably small font, a 
reasonable user is not prompted to read the terms. The purpose should not be to trap 
users into failing to read an agreement—we want users to read because they have a 
duty to—but to give them a fair opportunity to read. Not every user will think to zoom 
in to increase the font size, and they should not have to. 
206. The taskforce that was recommended would include business and legal 
experts who can determine what a reasonable maximum word limit is in terms of the 
industry standard. The taskforce could work with United States administrative 
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, Securities & Exchange 
Commission, Small Business Administration, etc. This would be part of the cost to 
enact and enforce this type of legislation (from administrative agency budgets and 
California state tax that is allocable to the courts and an agency such as the California 
Department of Consumer Affairs), which does not burden the businesses themselves. 
The word limit industry standard would incorporate factors such as the type of 
business, the type of product or service, the average word count amongst competitors 
in the same business, the length of a reasonably drafted agreement, etc. 
207. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1770(a), 1780–81 (West 2009 & Supp. 2018). The 
remedies for violations of section 1770(a)—deceptive practices—are codified in 
sections 1780–81. The deceptive practices that are unlawful generally include 
misrepresentation of the seller, source, affiliation, license, approval, quantity, or 
quality, while also advertising with the intent not to sell as advertised. In addition, 
representations that a transaction contains rights, remedies, or refunds that are not true 
or available are also unlawful. The deceptive practices listed within section 1770(a). 
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provided under this statute may be limited by the consumer contracts. 
The enforceability of the contract or certain provisions will determine 
the remedies that remain available in the event of a dispute. And, the 
CLRA focuses on regulating representations made by businesses, and 
such representations partially derive from the consumer contracts. 
B.  The Substantive Reform 
The SCCA would continue to follow the sliding scale approach of 
procedural and substantive unconscionability that California and other 
jurisdictions use for non-negotiated consumer contracts. Thus, even if 
the contract meets the sufficient notice requirements set forth above, it 
is still possible that there is procedural and/or substantive 
unconscionability because of the company’s superior bargaining power 
to include oppressive terms. Because the business drafts the contract, 
the business ultimately determines what terms should be included. A 
business is bottom-line driven, as it should be. Nonetheless, the 
interests of both parties must be considered when there is a binding 
contract. There are certain provisions that are inherently unfair because 
of the company’s superior bargaining power, which is why some terms 
are graylisted, which would shift the burden on the drafting party to 
avoid including unconscionable provisions. 
Graylisted terms shall be presumed substantively and procedurally 
unconscionable, unless such terms can overcome this presumption. 
Abiding by SCCA’s graylist of provisions does not immunize contracts 
from unconscionability scrutiny or interfere with other applicable 
contract defenses such as fraud or duress. The non-exhaustive list of 
these terms emulates that of the UCTD’s list: choice of forum, choice 
of law, disclaimer of warranties, reduced statutes of limitations, rolling 
contracts, and limitations of remedies.208 The burden is on the drafting 
_____________________________ 
208. See supra Part III Section A. Note that California’s Discover Bank rule, 
classifying most mandatory arbitration and class action waivers unconscionable, was 
preempted by the FAA in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
Also note because “rolling contracts,” or contracts that are modified without providing 
notice to the consumer of the new terms, would be unenforceable under the procedural 
component of the SCCA. Reduced statutes of limitations are already frowned upon 
by California law in non-negotiated contracts as substantively unconscionable. See 
W. Filter Corp. v. Argan, Inc., 540 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is a well-settled 
proposition of law [in California] that the parties to a contract may stipulate therein 
for a period of limitation, shorter than that fixed by the statute of limitations, and that 
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party to demonstrate that these provisions are not unconscionable (as 
opposed to the burden on the non-drafting party).209 An unconscionable 
term that appears unfair, but has not been graylisted, will be treated the 
same as a term that a California court finds unconscionable under the 
sliding scale doctrine. To resolve the unconscionability issues, the court 
may (1) remove the unconscionable term(s) out so the rest of the 
contract remains enforceable, (2) invalidate the entire contract, or (3) 
rewrite that specific term(s). 
C.  The Rationale Behind the Proposal 
In balancing both business and consumer interests, we must prevent 
certain acts that substantially burden one party.210 This proposal 
recognizes that this is not a complete solution, but it is a major step 
toward procedural consumer and business fairness, justice, and clarity. 
This proposal benefits both parties because “the formation stage is the 
least costly point at which parties could avoid the dispute, simply by 
adjusting problematic terms or refusing to enter the deal altogether.”211 
The proposed legislation requires the contract to be understandable, 
noticeable, and reasonable, but requires businesses to incorporate only 
_____________________________ 
such stipulation violates no principle of public policy, provided the period fixed be 
not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage in some way.”) (citing 
Moreno v. Sanchez, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684, 695 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). But see Ingle 
v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the 
reduced statute of limitations was substantively unconscionable). 
209. The purpose of providing a flexible mechanism for rendering terms 
unconscionable comes from a respect for the judicial system and its prior 
interpretations. Notwithstanding, these businesses will be forced to include terms that 
they feel confident could be shown as reasonable and fair to a judge. A brightline rule 
is too difficult to enforce, and each industry has its own unique set of challenges to be 
taken into account. 
210. See generally Christopher Kelley, Note, Old School “Wrap”: Exploring 
Traditional Contract Doctrine and Developing Law that can Serve to Prevent 
Websites from Exploiting Online Consumer Data, 231 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 28–30 
(2013) (explaining that courts have ignored fairness in one-sided contracts of 
adhesion). 
211. Daniel Barnhizer, Nancy Kim’s Wrap Contracts Symposium, Escaping 
Toxic Contracts: How We Have Lost the War on Assent in Wrap Contracts, 44 SW. 
L. REV. 215, 222 (2014) (explaining that in terms of improving consumer bargaining, 
policing contracts post-hoc is not the best moment for adherents to have an effect on 
transitioning). 
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modest resources to meet these standards. The SCCA acknowledges the 
transformation of contracts in a technologically advanced society and 
provides clear guidance as to when notice is sufficient. 
Moreover, some provisions are inherently unfair, causing the 
consumer to be left with almost no recourse to right a wrong. In many 
cases, these products may appear to impose little to no cost on the 
consumer, but ultimately, the consumer is exchanging confidential 
proprietary data that has monetary value to the business. Furthermore, 
many of these products or services are still expensive and consumers 
have invested substantial amounts of money toward them. How unfair 
is it for a consumer, whose personal data was hacked, to later find out 
it would be far too expensive to file an arbitration claim, considering 
that the cost of Lifelock Protection is cheaper? The consumer cannot 
simply undo an event that caused his or her social security number to 
be compromised. A data breach or unenforceable contract can can 
negatively impact businesses as well (especially their reputations). 
What about the business that spent hundreds of thousands in legal fees 
because its “Sign up” button did not expressly state that clicking “Sign 
up” meant acceptance of its TOU? 
Our economic model values freedom in contracting but also 
recognizes that a laissez-faire, reactive approach in this 
technologically-advanced society can simultaneously curtail this 
freedom, cost parties substantial amounts of money, and cause 
confusion to the drafting and non-drafting party. This proposal, while 
recognizing that certain substantive provisions have a legitimate 
purpose, attempts to provide well-measured freedom that considers 
both parties. Thus, certain provisions are presumed unfair unless the 
business meets its burden of overcoming the presumption. And, 
although businesses are already heavily regulated, there currently is not 
much guidance for wrap contracts, except for often inconsistent 
holdings amongst multiple jurisdictions. The SCCA provides that 
necessary guidance and takes both parties into account. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is demonstrable evidence that consumers are not reading 
wrap contracts. When they see a non-negotiable contract, many 
consumers conduct a quick cost-benefit analysis to determine whether 
the time to read the contract is worth the effort, in light of the possible 
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perceived benefits that they can obtain from the products or services. In 
many cases, however, consumers are not even aware that there is a 
contract associated with the particular product or service. Regardless of 
their choice or awareness level, consumers have a duty and interest to 
read consumer contracts, so the logical corollary of the duty to read 
should be the duty of businesses to make their contracts transparent and 
fair. There is a method to requiring these contracts be more readable 
and understandable in order to provide consumers a fair opportunity to 
review and assent to the terms of the contract. 
The statistics overwhelmingly demonstrate that online agreements 
are presented in a manner that make consumers inherently ignorant to 
them. Wrap contract doctrine has diverged dramatically from 
traditional contract doctrine in that the elements of offer, acceptance, 
mutual assent, and consideration have less value. In current United 
States case law, courts analyze whether there is sufficient notice of the 
terms of non-negotiated contracts, which are contracts we enter into, 
intentionally or not. This comment recognizes effective legislation, 
such as UCTD and UCP, and mirrors this type of consumer protection 
model. In addition, the SCCA intends to complement California’s 
CLRA regarding unfair and deceptive practices against consumers with 
certain targeted procedural and substantive requirements that will assist 
in vindicating such consumer rights the CLRA attempts to address. The 
goal is to balance the needs of consumers and businesses and provide a 
solution that benefits both parties. Therefore, I recommend the adoption 
of my proposed legislation in California, and federally thereafter. 
Heather Daiza* 
 
_____________________________ 
* J.D., California Western School of Law, 2018, cum laude; B.A. Political Science, 
University of California, Irvine, 2014. I would like to thank Professor Nancy S. Kim 
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formation, and enforcement; the California Western Law Review staff, particularly 
Editor-in-Chief Brooke Raunig, for her countless hours of hard work in our journal 
and editing this comment; and last but not least, my family, for their continuous love 
and support throughout this journey. 
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